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I. INTRODUCTION
"For some moments in life, there are no words."1
According to several surveys, almost one-half of public high school
districts currently include prayer in their graduation ceremonies; in
as many as three-quarters of those districts, students lead the
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prayers. 2 In Lee v. Weisman,S the Supreme Court held that a public
school graduation prayer is unconstitutional when a school official
opts to include prayer in the graduation. Following Lee, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Clear Creek
School District,4 found a distinction where a majority of students opt
for a religious invocation. A school district's permitting student-spon-
sored prayer, the court determined, does not breach the state's duty to
guarantee religious neutrality in the schools.
In the wake of Jones,5 Pat Robertson's American Center for Law
and Justice ("ACLJ) initiated an informational campaign, mailing
letters to 15,000 school officials and 300,000 "concerned citizens" ad-
vising them of Jones and asserting that student-sponsored prayer is
constitutional.6 In response to the ACLJ's actions, the American Civil
2. See Larry Barber, Prayer at Public School Graduation: A Survey, 75 Pm DELTA
KAPPAN 125 (1993); Chris Burritt, Holy Wars Waged As Prayer, Religion Return,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 20, 1994, at Al. In another survey, conducted by the
National School Boards Association, 14 of the 21 largest school districts across
the country permitted some form of graduation prayer. See BriefAmicus Curiae
of National School Boards Association in Support of Petitioners at 7 n.1, Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014). See also Phillip H. Harris, Invo.
cations, Benedictions, and Freedom of Speech in Public Schools, 68 EDuc. L. REP.
943, 954 (Sept. 1991)(regarding the importance of religious belief in society);
Henry J. Reske, Student-Led Prayers a Tough Subject, 79 A.BA_ J. 20 (Nov.
1993)(the number of graduation prayers was in the thousands, and in all fifty
states); Commentary, Graduation Invocations and Benedictions: Good Faith In-
terpretations, 89 ErUc. L. REP. 1061, 1063 & n.13 (June 1994)[hereinafter Gradu-
ation Invocations](discussing the prevalence of graduation prayers).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
4. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). In fact, the
court held that the right to free speech and free exercise of religion protects the
students' license to have such prayers. Id. at 969. See also Amy Louise Wein-
haus, The Fate of Graduation Prayers in Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 957, 979-80 (1993)(Lee failed to address the constitutionality of
student-initiated prayer).
5. Triggered by Jones and capitalizing on public sentiment, legislators in several
states introduced bills authorizing student-sponsored or voluntary prayers at
graduation and other school events. Jones v. Clear Creek Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d
963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). See Jeff Horner & Ben
Barlow, Prayer in Public Schools in Light of Lee v. Weisman and Its Progeny, 87
EDUC. L. REP. 323 (1994); Graduation Invocations, supra note 2, at 106. See also
Ingbretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994)(stat-
ing the court was bound by Jones and holding that a state statute permitting
student-sponsored prayers is unconstitutional outside of high school gradua-
tions); WnLIAm K. MUm, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967)(surveying
compliance with school prayer decisions); Richard Vara, School Prayer: Never an
Amen, HOUST. CHRON., Feb. 5, 1994, Religion Section 1 (Jones triggered many
school prayers).
6. See Reske, supra note 2, at 20. See also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F.
Supp. 446, 448-49 (M.D. Fla. 1994)(discussing the deluge of mailed information
from interest groups); Graduation Invocations, supra note 2, at 1061 n.3. Allan
Jay Sekulow, ACLJ Chief Counsel, stated that he personally spoke with repre-
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Liberties Union ("ACLU") launched its own crusade. The ACLU also
sent 15,000 letters to school officials, warning that Jones was decided
incorrectly and that student-sponsored prayers violate the
Constitution. 7
School officials, meanwhile, are caught in a religious and legal
crossfire.8 To add to that atmosphere of confusion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Harris v. Joint School Dis-
trict No. 241,9 rejected the holding of Jones, concluding that student-
sponsored graduation prayers violate the Establishment Clause's
guarantee of the state's "wholesome neutrality" toward religion.O
Given the prominence of student-sponsored prayer in public schools,
the political volatility of the issue, and the split in legal opinions,"' the
sentatives of 1,400 school districts nationwide, advancing the ACI's legal posi-
tion on student-sponsored graduation prayers. See Henry J. Reske, Graduation
Prayers, Part II, 79 A.B.A. J. 14 (July 1993).
7. Reske, supra note 6, at 14, 16. See also Graduation Invocations, supra note 2, at
16 & n.3 (noting the ongoing conflict between the ACLM and ACLU in interpret-
ing the constitutional status of student-sponsored graduation prayer).
8. See Reske, supra note 6, at 14. See also Barber, supra note 2, at 1250; Martha M.
McCarthy, Much Ado Over Graduation Prayer, 75 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 120
(1993)(noting that school boards and administrators are grappling with the issue
of prayers at graduations).
9. 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995). See also
ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., No. 93-5868 (3d Cir. June 25,
1993)(no opinion issued)(holding student-initiated prayers are unconstitutional),
application for review denied, App. No. A-92-974 (3d Cir. June 28, 1995).
10. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). Although the Supreme Court
vacated the Harris opinion as moot because the student-plaintiff graduated, the
case nonetheless represents the more equitable and constitutional view regarding
student-sponsored graduation prayer, as well as the line of cases holding that
such prayers are unconstitutional. See, e.g., ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional
Bd. of Educ., No. 93-5868 (3rd Cir. June 25, 1993); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch.
Bd., 844 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Va. 1993). Furthermore, the opinion is important
because it reflects the views of an influential circuit court, and will be examined
by other courts considering the constitutionality of student-sponsored graduation
prayers regardless of its actual precedential effect.
11. In addition to Harris and Jones, compare Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F.
Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994)(holding that student-initiated graduation prayers do
not violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test) and Griffith v.
Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992)(denying that invocation and benediction
at graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause) and Albright v.
Board of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 682 (D. Utah 1991)(permitting rather than requir-
ing students to give nondoctrinal prayers at graduation ceremonies does not vio-
late Establishment Clause) with ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ.,
No. 93-5868 (3rd Cir. June 25, 1993)(issuing injunction against graduation
prayer) and Gearon v. Loudun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va.
1993)(holding that Establishment Clause is violated when prayer is offered in a
graduation setting regardless of who makes the decision). See also A School




constitutionality of student-sponsored prayers at public school gradu-
ations is likely headed for resolution in the Supreme Court.
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of student-sponsored
graduation prayers in light of the Court's evolving interpretation of
the Establishment Clause's requirement of state neutrality in public
schools. It is not the purpose of this Article, however, to apply, or at-
tempt to reconcile, the disparate multi-element "tests" applied by the
Court, or members of the Court, to that issue.12 Instead, upon exam-ining the fundamental principles underlying the Court's application of
the Establishment Clause to public schools, this Article advances the
theory that those principles compel schools to ensure that graduation
ceremonies be free from religiosity.
Part II examines the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, fo-
cusing on the Court's strict application of the Establishment Clause's
neutrality requirement to public schools. Part III attempts to define
"neutrality" as demanded by the Establishment Clause by examining
the Court's application of the term in the public school context. This
Part argues that the Court has demanded a "substantive" neutrality
in public schools, as opposed to a "formal" neutrality. Such a formal
model of neutrality would require only that the state enact neutral
procedures, forbidding practices that risk infusing religiosity into
mandatory school events, but permitting religion in public schools
where school officials do not compel students to hear the potentially
12. Traditionally, the Court has applied the tripartite Lemon test to Establishment
Clause cases. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also School Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985)(Lemon has been applied in every case involving
religion in schools). Under the Lemon test, to satisfy the Establishment Clause, a
governmental practice must: (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have the
primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid fostering
excessive government entanglement with religion. See Committee For Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). The Court in Lee
considered the Lemon framework unnecessary to assess the constitutionality of
the graduation prayer, because the "pervasive" government involvement in se-
lecting the prayer differentiated Lee from those cases involving "difficult ques-
tions" of church and state. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). The
Court also declined to apply the "endorsement" approach, a modification of
Lemon applied by a majority of Justices in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 592-95 (1989). Under the endorsement test, the government violates
the Establishment Clause where it intentionally promotes religion or a "reason-
able observer" would believe the religious message conveyed a government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion. See id.; School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 379,
389 (1985). Instead, the Lee Court applied a coercion analysis which Justice Ken-
nedy and the four dissenting Justices accepted. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2655 (1992); id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(the coercion in-
quiry "must be undertaken with sensitivity to the special circumstances that ex-
ist in a secondary school where the line between voluntary and coerced
participation may be difficult to draw. No such coercion, however, has been
shown to exist as a necessary result [in this case].").
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unwanted religious messages. Part IV examines Lee's extension of the
principles of substantive neutrality to school events unrelated to the
classroom. Part V discusses student-sponsored prayers in light of the
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause. This Part ana-
lyzes Harris and Jones, and argues that schools must guarantee that
students do not employ otherwise facially neutral procedures to im-
pose religious messages at graduation. The Article concludes that be-
cause graduations are school-sponsored events, bearing "the
imprimatur" of the state,13 the school must safeguard the rights of
dissident students regarding graduation prayers.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE SCHOOLS
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."14
The Establishment Clause has been described as a metaphorical
"wall," a term borrowed from a letter of Thomas Jefferson,15 that
segregates religious activities from governmental endorsement.16 Ap-
plied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,17 the Establish-
ment Clause demands governmental neutrality in the area of religion.
13. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 T-m
WarrINGS or THomAs JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Library ed. 1861). See Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982)(discussing Jefferson's use of the term "wall"). Other
Constitutional Framers also embraced the divorce of church and state. For in-
stance, James Madison believed church and state should remain separated, and
he opposed public funding for military and legislative chaplains. See James
Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 THE FouNDEiRs CONSTrrUTioN 103, 104
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). See also IX THE WrrNGs OF
JAITEs MADISON 487 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); Brook Millard, Note, Lee v. Weis-
man and the Majoritarian Implications of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
71 DEN. U. L. REv. 759, 759-61 (1994)(citing Framers' views of church-state sepa-
ration). In fact, the separation of church and state was advanced in the colonies
as early as Roger Williams. See Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Provi-
dence (Jan. 1655), in 5 THE FOuNDERes CONSTUTION 50 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Learner eds., 1987). But see John K. Wilson, Religion Under the States'
Constitutions, 1776-1800, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 753, 754 (1990)(9 of 13 colonies had
established churches at the time of the American Revolution).
16. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 231 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); D. Jarrett Arp,
Note, Beyond Mergens: Balancing a Student's Free Speech Rights Against the
Establishment Clause in a Public School Equal Access Case, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 127, 129-30 (1991).
17. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484 (1994); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Several cases interpreting the Establishment Clause
were decided prior to Everson, but none involved state laws. See, e.g., Bradford v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Davis v. Beacon, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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Specifically, the government may prefer neither specific denomina-
tions nor beliefs, nor religion over non-religion.18
However, the Establishment Clause's antithetical twin, the Free
Exercise Clause,19 erodes the foundation of Jefferson's constitutional
religious "wall." The Free Exercise Clause allows, and sometimes re-
quires, Congress to remove otherwise neutral laws that unduly bur-
den an individual's ability to freely practice her religion.20 Under the
auspices of the Free Exercise Clause, moreover, the government may
acknowledge and accommodate religion and pass laws that are secular
in nature but have the coincidental effect of benefitting religion or reli-
gious worship.2 1
Thus, although the unified function of these two seemingly opposed
clauses is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the
church or the state] into the precincts of the other,"2 2 the intermin-
gling of government and religion is inevitable and the Court does not
call for "total separation" of church and state.23 As a result, "far from
being a 'wall,' [the Establishment Clause] is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular re-
lationship."24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court repeatedly has at-
tempted 25 to resolve the tension between the individuals' right to
worship and the strictures preventing government from endorsing
particular religious practices 2 6 or entangling itself in matters of
religion. 27
18. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589-90, 605 n.55 (1989); School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985).
19. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 338-39 (1987). But see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 422 (1961).
22. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984)(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-
04 (1940); E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1994).
23. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)(":he Court has strug-
gled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are
cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other.... The course of constitutional neutrality in
this area cannot be an absolutely straight line."); Daniel Parish, Comment, Pri-
vate Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. Cm. L. Rev. 253, 254 (1994).
26. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985).




That tension has been especially prominent-perhaps more so
than in any other milieu-in public education.28 In general, the Court
has subjected government actions in public schools to stricter Estab-
lishment Clause scrutiny than in other contexts involving the state
and religion.29 The Supreme Court's rationale for that distinction is
clear:
Students in [public] institutions are impressionable and their attendance is
involuntary. The State exerts great authority and coercive power through
mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation
of teachers as role models and the students susceptibility to peer pressure.
Furthermore, "[tlhe public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and
the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of
the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools...." 30
An additional psychological harm caused by school prayer is the
state's implicit promotion of majoritarian beliefs and the discourage-
ment of minority religions.31 The government, by sponsoring prayer
in an educational setting, counsels children that by accepting the ten-
ets of the dominant religion, or of religion over irreligion, one becomes
an insider or a part of the "social mainstream."3 2 In contrast,
nonadherents relegate themselves to a position of societal inferi-
ority.33 Thus, the pressure inherent in school prayer both inflicts a
state-created "status harm" by alienating nonadherents,34 and in-
28. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Sta-
tus of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 1, 1 (1986).
29. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987); School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
30. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)(quoting McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203,231 (1948))(internal citations omitted). See Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-59 (1992); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
31. See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the
Symbols of Government, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1992). See also
Julia Lieblich, Mom Battles Prayers in Schools, RocKy MTN. NEws, Jan. 1, 1995,
at 78A (chronicling the exclusion and isolation from refusing to participate in
school prayers).
32. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981). See also Burritt, supra note 2 (noting this phenome-
non as well).
33. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
Nw. U. L. Ray. 1113, 1168 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Faiths, Flags, and Family
Values: The Constitution of the Theater State, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5 (1993);
Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31; Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the
Establishment Clause, 42 DE PAUL L. Rav. 373, 379-80 (1992); Andrea Hecht,
Private Matter of Prayer Just Doesn't Fit in Public Schools, L.A. Tnzms, Dec. 11,
1994, at B15; Ruth Rosen, Perspective on Schools; When Religion Is Used to Ex-
clude, L-A. Tm rs, Dec. 4, 1994, at M5. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring)("Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political commu-
nity, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.").
34. See Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31, at 504.
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duces religious conformity in children, who are particularly suscepti-
ble to such pressures.
Against this legal and moral background, the Court has, beginning
with Everson v. Board of Education,35 settled numerous controversies
pitting the conflicting rights of students to pray against the rights of
nonbelievers and religious minorities seeking freedom from religious
doctrinization, ostracization, and perceived persecution.S6 The "Reli-
gion Clauses" 3 7 have, therefore, been interpreted in myriad educa-
tional settings, including the use of public funds for religious study
and prayer;38 the subjects within a curriculum;3 9 the provision of
school supplies,40 teachers,41 and transportation;42 and prayer dur-
ing43 and after school hours,44 on campus and off,4 5 audibly4 6 and si-
lently,47 and even pasted on school walls.48 In each of these cases, the
Court mandated that the state remain "neutral" with regard to reli-
gious worship;49 in none of these cases, however, did it explicitly
define "neutrality."50 Thus, how the Court has applied the Establish-
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
36. See Karst, Faiths, Flags, supra note 33, at 5. Cf Karst, Politics of Religion, supra
note 31, at 519 ("The most painful harm of Jim Crow was not the denial of specific
rights but the symbolic exclusion of a group of Americans from full membership
in the community."). See also Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Over-
comers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Law and Policy for
People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1406 (1990)(on the stigmatiza-
tion of people with disabilities).
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
38. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437
(1962)(Douglas, J., concurring).
39. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
40. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
41. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
42. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
43. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981).
45. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
46. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
48. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
49. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968)("[Tlhe State may not
adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which aid or oppose
any religion. The prohibition is absolute. It forbids alike the preference of a reli-
gious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a par-
ticular dogma.")(internal quotations omitted); George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and
Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 707, 719 & n.79 (1993).
50. John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48
U. Prrr. L. REv. 83, 84 (1986).
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ment Clause's demand of "neutrality" to public schools must be
explored.5 '
IIL INTERPRETING "NEUTRALITY"
A. Substantive and Formal Neutrality
The Court's application of the principle of "neutrality" in the school
context renders the term, perhaps, a misnomer.5 2 Neutrality implies
that the government must not only refrain from promoting or discour-
aging religion, in the sense of impartiality,53 but must also refrain
from intervening to protect religious dissenters from unwanted reli-
gious messages articulated by a majority of private parties.54 Neu-
trality, in that sense, is equated with a passive, or "formal"
impartiality.55
While state passivity is perhaps permissible outside the school con-
text,5 6 the special nature of schools mandates a different approach.57
51. Although other commentators have focused on the Court's use (or misuse) of the
term "neutrality" in general, this Article limits itself to the Court's usage of neu-
trality with regard to public schools. See, e.g., Laycock, Equal Access, supra note
28, at 6-9; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 993 (1990); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Per-
ceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorse-
ment" Test, 86 MIoC. L. REv. 266, 313-16 (1987)(the term neutrality is
indeterminate); Valauri, supra note 50, at 84-128 (establishment neutrality con-
tains two components: impartiality and noninvolvement). See also CAss SuN-
STEiN, THE PARnTLAL CONSTTUTIoN (1993).
52. See Wallace, supra note 22, at 1196 & n.64 (discussing the difficulty of reconciling
neutrality with public education). See also Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on
Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44
MERCER L. REv. 881, 884 (1993)("the Court has been diligent in maintaining the
wall of separation between church and state in public schools.").
53. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 96 (1961). See also Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated,
supra note 51, at 1010 ("I suspect that the Justices are not deciding on the basis
of neutrality at all"); Smith, supra note 51, at 313-16; Mark Tushnet, "Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Or. RFv. 373;
Valauri, supra note 50, at 84-128 (establishment neutrality contains two compo-
nents: impartiality and noninvolvement); Wallace, supra note 22, at 1204-05.
54. See, e.g., MIERRI-WEBSTER'S COLLEG.ATE DICTIONARY 781 (10th ed. 1993)(neu-
tral is defined as "not engaged on either side").
55. I draw the term from Justice Souter's concurrence in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2241 (1993)(Souter, J., con-
curring). Justice Souter, in turn, borrowed the phrase from Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated, supra note 51, at 1000. I do not restrict the use
of that term in this Article, in its application to school prayer, to that of Souter or
Laycock. See also Wallace, supra note 22, at 1194 (discussing definition of
neutrality).
56. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 662 (1989)(Kennedy, J., concur-
ring and dissenting in part); Laycock, Benefits of the Establishment Clause, supra
note 33, at 379.
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As the Court noted in Edwards v. Aguillard, "[f]amilies entrust public
schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust
on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of
the student and his or her family."5s Commentators have used the
term "substantive neutrality" to describe the Establishment Clause's
mandate that government interfere with religion as little as possi-
ble.59 Therefore, I will borrow the term "substantive neutrality" to
characterize the Court's consistent demand that the state guarantee
that compulsory school events remain free of religiosity6O and inter-
vene where speakers intend to subject students to religious messages
at obligatory school events. 61 Thus, in contrast to the passivity associ-
ated with "formal" neutrality, "substantive" neutrality in the public
schools requires an active participation by the schools to guarantee
that religion remain absent from school-sponsored events.62
For instance, in School District v. Schempp,63 the Court addressed
the constitutionality of a school's broadcasting student-led prayers at
the outset of each school day over the school's intercommunications
system. In striking down the practice, the Court specifically found
that although a majority of the students might favor such prayers, the
government's guarantee of neutrality means it cannot permit a major-
57. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980). See also Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31, at 521; Lay-
cock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated, supra note 51, at 1012; Recent De-
velopments in First Amendment Law, 19 J. CoNTEm. L. 251, 277
(1993)(discussing the unique nature of schools); Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition
to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 (1983).
58. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1980).
59. See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated, supra note 51, at 1002-06.
See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2241 (Souter, J., concurring)(using the term substantive neutrality); Doug-
las Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10-11.
60. See Dent, supra note 49, at 718; Stone, supra note 57, at 828.
61. See Stone, supra note 57, at 847. As the Court stated in School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985), "Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized
by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination" of religion. Id. at 385. See also Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951)("Government may not finance religious groups
nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education.").
But see Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977, 978 (neutrality is another form of hostility toward
religion).
62. See Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 424 (E.D. Ark.
1973)(finding that neutrality is not equated with passivity in public schools, but
an active guarantee that mandatory school events are free from religious
overtones).
63. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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ity to "use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."64 The
Court quoted West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,65 stating,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori-
ties and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to... freedom of worship ... may not be submitted to
vote. 6 6
The Court did not equate the concept of neutrality, therefore, with a
passive indifference that would enable a majority of students to sub-
ject a nonadherent to religious messages; instead, it held that neutral-
ity entails an active insulation of students from religious expression in
the school.
B. Application of Substantive Neutrality
The Supreme Court has not limited its use of substantive neutral-
ity in the classroom to practices that actually infuse religion. The
Court has held that where a state enacts a facially neutral policy that
creates a risk that the classroom will be used to "inculcate students
... in religious precepts," the entire scheme is unconstitutional, re-
gardless of whether such inculcation actually transpires.6 7 Thus, a
classroom prayer is unconstitutional even if students are able to avoid
the religious message or no school official ultimately decides the
prayer will be offered. Where a risk of religiosity in school-sponsored
events exists, "the State is constitutionally compelled to assure that
* . . state-supported activity is not being used for religious
indoctrination."68
In Stone v. Graham,6 9 the Court applied that principle to a state
law that required the posting of copies of the Ten Commandments,
purchased with private contributions, on the walls of each public
classroom.7 0 In enjoining enforcement of the law,71 the Court recog-
64. Id. at 225-26.
65. 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943).
66. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
67. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1991); School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 387 (1985)(state must prevent indoctrination from occurring);
Wolman v. Wolter, 433 U.S. 229,254 (1977); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349,369-
70 (1975). Cf Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 656 (1980); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
68. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
69. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
70. The posters contained a disclaimer stating that the Ten Commandments are the
fundamental source of the "legal code of Western Civilization and the common
law of the United States." Id. at 40. The Court nonetheless found the Command-
ments-as a sacred Judeo-Christian text forbidding such practices as the using of
the Lord's name in vain and mandating observance of the Sabbath-religious in
nature. Id. at 41-42.
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nized that the Commandments would neither be read aloud nor be a
part of the school's curriculum.72 In fact, the Court explicitly noted
that students might be unmoved by the Commandments. However,
the Court held that merely by posting the text, the state might "induce
the school children to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and
obey, the commandments."73 The Court held that the Constitution
forbids the state from risking the provision of such influence. In dis-
sent, then-Justice Rehnquist argued that the Commandments were a
"passive" symbol, and the case involved "no compulsion" for students
to follow the teachings;74 the majority, however, found the risk of in-
doctrination, while speculative, sufficiently substantial to merit strik-
ing down the law.
Similarly, in School District v. Ball,75 the Court considered two
laws, one subsidizing nonpublic school teachers for teaching secular
subjects in nonpublic schools, the other permitting full-time public
school teachers to teach secular subjects in nonpublic schools. The
Court found both practices unconstitutional because of the state's fail-
ure to monitor the content of the courses for religiosity.7 6 In other
words, the state failed to guarantee that the courses would be free
from religious messages. Although the Court recognized there existed
"no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination," it found
this "lack of evidence of ... little significance."77 Thus, these cases
demonstrate that the Court has not confined its application of sub-
stantive neutrality to school actions actually causing the infusion of
religion in schools, but has employed the principle to those practices
creating the risk of infusion.78
The ability of students to absent themselves from religious
messages in public schools does not necessarily make the practice sub-
stantively neutral.79 In Engel v. Vitale,80 for instance, the Court
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
76. Id. at 387.
77. Id. at 388-89.
78. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)("The potential for impermissi-
ble fostering of religion is present."). That rule is equally applicable regarding
the use of state funds for religious indoctrination, whereby a state must guaran-
tee that any aid given to religious schools must be used in a secular manner. See
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973). See also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 387 (1985)(state must prevent
indoctrination from occurring); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977);
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-70 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 619 (1971).
79. See Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 832 (11th Cir. 1989)("The
Establishment Clause focuses on the constitutionality of the state action, not on
the choices made by the complaining individual.").
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struck down as unconstitutional a nonsectarian prayer that students
voluntarily recited in class at the beginning of each school day. The
Court overruled the New York Court of Appeals, which found the
prayer constitutional because the state did not compel participation in
the religious exercise, as students were permitted to remain silent or
leave the room.8 ' The Court held that although students could avoid
the religious messages, "[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."8 2 Accordingly, stu-
dents' ability to avoid religious messages does not suffice to save a
school's practice from unconstitutionality.s3
The Court's analysis does not change when the state delegates a
decision concerning religion to a private actor. In Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc.,S4 a state statute vested power in the governing bodies of
schools and churches to prevent issuance of liquor licenses within a
500 foot radius of the church or school. In striking down the statute,
the Court found that the churches' power could be "employed for ex-
plicitly religious goals," and that the statute did not necessarily pro-
vide an "'effective means of guaranteeing' that the delegated power
'will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological pur-
poses.'"s5 As a result, although the authority to make the final deci-
sion rested with a private body, the Court found the scheme
unconstitutional because the state failed to guarantee that the result
of the transfer of authority would be "neutral."86
Recently, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Dis-
trict v. Grumet,S7 the Court extended the logic of Larkin to public
schools. In that case, a state statute created a school district with
boundaries drawn to exclusively include property owned and inhab-
ited by the Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism.
The Satmar Hasidim, therefore, had exclusive political control over
the school district. The Court found that the state had delegated its
authority to a group "chosen according to a religious criterion,"88 and
80. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
81. See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1961). See also Engel v. Vitale, 191
N.Y.S.2d 453, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1959)(dicussing voluntariness of the prayers).
82. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
83. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Collins v. Chandler Unified
Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist.
No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 425 (E.D. Ala. 1973).
84. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
85. Id. at 125 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 756,
780 (1973)).
86. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989)(Establishment
Clause prevents delegating governmental power to a religious group).
87. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
88. Id. at 2488.
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had thereby created a "fusion of governmental and religious func-
tions."8 9 Because the state intended to create such a fusion "on the
basis of religion,"90 the statute was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the Court found an unconstitutional risk inherent in
the potential effects of the delegation. The Court noted that in Larkin,
the constitutional concern centered on churches using "civic power to
advance the interests of religion."91 In Kiryas Joel, however, the
Court found the threat to neutrality occurred at a stage "antecedent"
to any religously based decisions made by the school district, because
there was no guarantee that the Satmar would use the legislative
power delegated to them in a religiously neutral manner.92 Therefore,
state delegation of decisionmaking authority must be based on "princi-
ples neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious identities are
incidental to their receipt of civic authority,"93 and, moreover, the
state must ensure that the delegation does not create an undue risk of
religious favoritism.94 Substantive neutrality thus prohibits not only
schemes that infuse or risk infusing religion into public schools (re-
gardless of student ability to avoid the religious expression), but also
the vesting of state powers in private groups who might make educa-
tional decisions on the basis of religion.
C. Religion in Schools Outside the Scope of Substantive
Neutrality
Although substantive neutrality forbids practices creating a risk of
infusing religion in public schools, the Court nonetheless has found it
inevitable that school and religion will interact.95 The Court has lim-
ited those cases permitting the intermingling of religion and public
education to instances where it found no risk that nonadherent stu-
dents will be subjected to religious messages.96 The Court found such
assurances because all potential religious messages at issue in those
cases occurred at strictly voluntary events that the school neither
sponsored nor pressured students to attend.97 These cases uniformly
89. Id. at 2490 (quoting Larkin v. Grenders Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982)).
90. Id. at 2489.
91. Id. at 2491.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2489.
94. Id. at 2491-92.
95. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
96. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 454 U.S. 226,251
(1990).
97. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2148 (1993); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 226 (1990); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-15 (1952).
See also Randall v. Pegan, 765 F. Supp. 793, 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Michael S.
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involved either the mandated equal treatment of religious groups in
public or limited public fora,9 s or general, neutral state services appli-
cable to all school children that gave incidental aid to religious institu-
tions.9 9 Because they included safeguards preventing the risk of
religiosity in compelled school events, these practices were found to be
substantively neutral.
For instance, in Zorach v. Clauson,00 the Court upheld the prac-
tice of allowing public school students to receive off campus religious
education during normal periods of instruction. The Court specifically
noted, however, that the case involved no "religious instruction in pub-
lic school classrooms"1O1 and created no risk that nonadherents would
be subjected to unwanted religious messages. It stated:
No one is forced to go to the religious classroom and no religious exercise or
instruction is brought to the classrooms of the public schools. A student need
not take religious instruction. He is left to his own desires as to the manner or
time of his religious devotions, if any.1 02
The Court concluded that "[g]overnment may not ... blend secular
and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or
some religion on any person.... The Government must be neutral....
It may not coerce anyone to attend a church, to observe a religious
holiday, or to take religious instruction."103 Thus, religion and schools
need not necessarily remain entirely disengaged, so long as the state
adequately protects the nonadherent from religiosity arising out of
otherwise neutral practices.
Similarly, in Board of Education v. Mergens,1o4 the Court forbade
a school from discriminating against a religious club seeking to use
school facilities in a manner equal to other noncurricular clubs. The
Court found that by permitting student groups to use school facilities,
the school created a limited public forum," and therefore, the Free
Speech Clause prevented the school from denying the use of that facil-
ity to certain groups because of their character. In so holding, the
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RPs. L. Rv. 795, 852 (1993); Arp, supra
note 16, at 134-36.
98. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2148-49 (1993); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1985).
99. See, e.g., Wolman y. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 242 (1977); Meek v. Pittiger, 421 U.S.
341, 361 n.8 (1975); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). See also
Nyquist v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 756, 781-82(1973)(services provided to all citizens, "so separate and so indisputably marked
off from the religious function," are constitutional because they demonstrate neu-
trality toward religion, rather than support (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947))).
100. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
101. Id. at 308.
102. Id. at 311.
103. Id. at 314.
104. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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Court specifically noted that the case involved meetings during "non-
instructional time" that were unrelated to formal school activities.1Oa
Like Zorach, this case also involved no risk that nonadherents would
be subjected to unwanted religious messages. 10 6
Finally, last term the Supreme Court, in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia,30 7 found unconstitutional a pub-
lic university's policy of distributing student funds to student groups
for use in publishing magazines and newspapers, but refusing to fund
groups seeking to circulate publications with a religious orientation.
The Court ruled that the university's funding program created a lim-
ited public forum, and, as in Mergens, the school could not discrimi-
nate against religious student groups solely because of their religious
perspective.10 However, like Mergens, the Court also noted that the
university made an effort to disassociate itself from the students' reli-
gious speech,109 and that no risk existed that unwilling students
would be compelled to read the religious literature.1o
Thus, from these cases it is evident that neutral policies accommo-
dating prayer are acceptable, so long as sufficient precautions exist to
protect the nonadherent from unwanted religious influence.",1 How-
ever, substantive neutrality, as applied throughout the Court's deci-
sions in school cases, dictates that, without such protections, the
prayers are unconstitutional.11 2
105. Id. at 251.
106. See id. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
n.14 (1981); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,631-32 (1943). Recently, in Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), the Court found
a school district violated the right of a church to show a religiously oriented film
on family values in school facilities that other civic groups used for nonreligious
purposes. In dismissing the school's Establishment Clause claim, the Court
stated, "The showing of this film would not have been during school hours, would
not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the pub-
lic. .. ."Id. at 2148. See generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine
and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons from Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L.
REv. 1, 17 (1994)("Lamb's Chapel is not typically a 'schools' case.' ").
107. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
108. See id. at 2518-19.
109. See id. at 2523.
110. See id.
111. See Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist. No. 7,394 F. Supp. 417,426-27 (E.D. Ala.
1973)(finding unconstitutional the reading of prayers by students each day in
classrooms and over school intercommunications systems, but upholding volun-
tary, privately sponsored baccalaureate ceremonies held in the school auditorium
during non-school hours).
112. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925). But see Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevita-
ble Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 CAsE W. RE. L. REv. 773, 787 (1993).
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IV. LEE v. WEISMAN
The Court's recent opinion in Lee extends the principles of substan-
tive neutrality in public schools to school-sponsored events outside the
classroom.113 In Lee, pursuant to district practice, Robert E. Lee,
principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School, invited a Rabbi to speak at
graduation. 1 14 Lee provided the Rabbi with a pamphlet that recom-
mended that speakers compose public prayers for secular occasions
with "inclusiveness and sensitivity115 and advised the Rabbi that the
invocation and benediction should be nonsectarian. 1 16
Daniel Weisman, the father of a graduating senior, sought a per-
manent injunction to bar school officials in the district from inviting
religious figures to deliver graduation prayers.1 1 7 The district court
held that the practice of including invocations and benedictions in
public school graduation ceremonies had the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion and, therefore, granted the injunction.ls The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in a split deci-
sion and adopted the district court's opinion.1 ' 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari20 and affirmed.121
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion recognized that religiosity in
the school context implicated "heightened" Establishment Clause con-
cerns12 2 and noted that graduations are necessarily school-sponsored
events. The Court stated that "[alt a high school graduation, teachers
and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the
precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the move-
113. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1993)("Lee is
merely the most recent in a long line of cases carving out of the Establishment
Clause what essentially amounts to a per se rule prohibiting public-school-re-
lated or initiated religious expression or indoctrination.").
114. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652 (1992).
115. Id. The pamphlet was prepared by the National Conference of Christians and
Jews.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2654.
118. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D.R.I. 1990). The court found that the
practice "create[d] an identification of the state with a religion, or with religion in
general" and had the effect of "endors[ing] one religion over another, or to endorse
religion in general." Id. at 71-72.
119. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). Judge Bownes concurred, finding
the school's practice violated all three prongs of Lemon. Id..at 1095 (Bownes, J.,
concurring). Judge Campbell dissented, reasoning that if the prayers are nonsec-
tarian and if school officials ensure that persons representing diversity of beliefs
and values delivered the prayers, the Establishment Clause would not be vio-
lated. Id. at 1099 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
120. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
121. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
122. See id. at 2658, 2660. See also Dent, supra note 49, at 716-18 (noting that Estab-
lishment Clause standard differs depending upon the context).
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ments, the dress, and the decorum of the students."123 Furthermore,
the Court found that student attendance at this school-sponsored
event was de facto obligatory, regardless of whether students could
receive their diplomas in absentia, because of the cultural significance
of a high school graduation. The Court stated:
[T]o say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school
graduation is formalistic in the extreme.... Everyone knows that in our soci-
ety and in our culture high school graduation is one of life's most significant
occasions. A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the point. At-
tendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a stu-
dent is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real
sense of the term "voluntary," .... 124
Therefore, a high school graduation is a school-sponsored event at
which "the State has in every practical sense compelled [student]
attendance."1 25
The Court found that the inclusion of prayer at such a compulsory
ceremony created a risk that state and peer pressure would likely co-
erce dissident students to symbolically participate by standing or
maintaining a "respectful silence" during the prayer. The Court
stated,
in our culture standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or
simple respect for those who do.... It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then,
to be told that for her the act of standing or remaining silent signifies mere
respect, rather than participation. What matters is that, given our social con-
ventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group
exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.1 2 6
The Court additionally held that the prayer would remain uncon-
stitutional even if the student's choice to remain absent was meaning-
fully voluntary, because a high school graduation is one of life's most
significant occasions."'27 Thus, abstention from the ceremony would
entail forbearance of one of "those intangible benefits which have mo-
tivated the student [to labor through high school]."128 The Court
based its rationale on a long hallowed Establishment Clause principle
that "the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her
123. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992). See also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)(holding that school officials can discipline student speak-
ers at school-sponsored events for using offensive language).
124. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
125. Id. at 2661.
126. Id. at 2658. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)("he 'establishment of religion means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can force nor influence
a person.., to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' "); Dent, supra note 49,
at 718.
127. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992).
128. Id. See also Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.
1981)(holding that school functions are too important to be missed "voluntarily"
in order to avoid a religious message).
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rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-spon-
sored religious practice."' 2 9 The Court further stated that "it is the
objector, not the majority, who must take unilateral and private action
to avoid compromising religious scruples, here by electing to miss the
graduation exercise."130
Thus, although the prayers were nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
and brief, the Court found the prayers unconstitutional because they
were religious messages that were delivered at a compulsory, school-
sponsored event.' 31 That holding is fully consonant with the Court's
prior interpretations that the Establishment Clause requires substan-
tive neutrality in public schools.
V. STUDENT-SPONSORED GRADUATION PRAYERS
Because Lee extends the Court's heightened scrutiny of religiosity
in the school context to events outside the classroom,132 student-spon-
sored graduation prayers must be analyzed according to the Court's
substantive neutrality principles. Factually, however, cases involving
student-sponsored prayers at graduation ceremonies are uniquely dif-
ferent from prior school Establishment Clause cases. The prayers, by
definition, are selected by students, and thus are distinguishable from
Engel, where the state made the ultimate decision to have voluntary,
nondenominational prayer. Nonetheless, Lee indicates that gradua-
tion ceremonies are school-sponsored events that students are com-
pelled to attend. Mergens, then, is inapposite, because it concerned a
religious club that met after school hours, that the school did not spon-
sor, and that students attended on a strictly voluntary basis. The
anomalous nature of student-sponsored prayer thus compels a close
examination using the basic principles of substantive neutrality.
Student-sponsored graduation prayers can be divided into two cat-
egories. Jones and Harris consider the constitutionality of the first:
where the state specifically delegates to students the decision to have
129. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992). See also West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
130. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992). Furthermore, the Court found the
brevity of the prayers was immaterial, because "the embarrassment and the in-
trusion of the religious exercise" causes an actual injury which "cannot be refuted
by arguing that these prayers.., are of a de minimis character." Id. at 2659.
While to a majority, therefore, the prayer might seem innocuous, the Court found
that "in a school context [it] may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy."
Id. at 2658.
131. In Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D. Kan. 1992), the court rejected a
motion for summary judgment, concluding a public school's inclusion of a prayer
at graduation rendered the school potentially liable for damages caused to a dissi-
dent student.
132. See Dent, supra note 49, at 715.
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a graduation prayer. The second concerns facially-neutral procedures
for selecting graduation speakers whose topics are void of religiously
dominated messages.
A. Harris and Jones
The facts in Harris and Jones133 are substantially similar. In both
cases, the school district submitted the question of whether the gradu-
ation ceremony would contain prayer to a student vote. In Harris the
students also could choose whether a student or "minister" would de-
liver the prayer, 13 4 while in Jones, a student volunteer would recite
all blessings.135
Despite the cases' factual similarities, the courts reached opposite
conclusions. In Jones136 the court found that secular solemnization of
the ceremony was the school district's intent and the prayers' primary
effect, that the prayers did not advance religion,137 and that the stu-
dent selection and delivery of them abated school entanglement in
religion.13s
The court also found that by relinquishing control of the prayers to
the students, the government minimized school sponsorship. The
Court stated that the case was ultimately distinguishable from Lee
where the government selected the prayer because in Jones the gov-
ernment allowed, but did not command, prayer. 13 9 Additionally, the
court found the nonadherents' presence at the ceremony did not sub-
ject them to compelling pressure to participate in a religious exercise,
133. For an in depth discussion of the opinion in Jones, see Allan Gordus, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Prayers in Public High School Graduations: Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District, 47 Aam L. REv. 653 (1994).
134. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447,452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The school
also included a disclaimer in the graduation program stating that the Board of
the Joint School District neither promoted nor endorsed any statements made in
the graduation ceremony. Id.
135. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
136. In applying the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test, the
Jones opinion reflects the current confusion over the correct legal doctrine appli-
cable in Establishment Clause cases. For discussions of that confusion, see
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 69 U. Cm. L. REv.
115, 115 (1992)("a more confused and often counterproductive mode of interpret-
ing the First Amendment would have been difficult to devise."); Gene R. Nichol,
Religion and the State: Introduction, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 833, 833
(1986)(the American law of church and state is far from settled. It even may be
the case that it... is less certain, more torn, and more confused... than at any
time in the past.").
137. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
138. Id. at 968. Thus, the court upheld the school district resolution under the Lemon
formulation.
139. Id. at 970.
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because the student decision on prayers creates "less psychological
pressure on students than the prayer at issue in Lee, because all stu-
dents, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will
be given, are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers,
who are less able to coerce participation than an authority figure from
the state or clergy."140 The court concluded that "[t]he practical result
of our decision, viewed in light of Lee, is that a majority of students
can do what the State acting on its own cannot do to incorporate
prayer in public high school graduation ceremonies."141 The court
thus upheld the district practice.' 42
140. Id. at 971.
141. Id. at 972. The court continued,
In Lee, the Court forbade schools from exacting participation in a reli-
gious exercise as the price for attending what many consider to be one of
life's most important events. This case requires us to consider why so
many people attach importance to graduation ceremonies. If they only
seek government's recognition of student achievement, diplomas suffice.
If they only seek God's recognition, a privately-sponsored baccalaureate
will do. But to experience the community's recognition of student
achievement, they must attend the public ceremony that other inter-
ested community members also hold so dear. By attending graduation to
experience and participate in the community's display of support for the
graduates, people should not be surprised to find the event affected by
community standards.
Id.
142. Although the court in Jones also found that the Free Exercise Clause and the
Free Speech Clause protect the constitutionality of student-proposed prayer at a
graduation ceremony, this analysis is flawed. Under the Free Exercise Clause,
the state may, and sometimes must, accommodate the free exercise of religious
worship by relieving people from generally applicable rules that interfere with
their religious activities. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Later-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Secular graduations, however,
impose no "burden" on religious students' religious activities. See Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2677 (1992)(Souter, J., concurring); Lundberg v. West
Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 337 (N.D. Iowa 1989). See also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)(discussing burdens on religion); Gra-
ham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531,537 (S.D. Iowa 1985). In
contrast, to include a prayer in the graduation ceremony violates the dissenter's
free exercise rights because it conditions her attendance of her school gradua-
tion-an obvious benefit-on her compromising her religious belief. See Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2673 (1992)(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38-40 (1985); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981).
Regarding free speech, although the court in Jones found that a student-pro-
posed graduation prayer occurs in a limited public forum, where the state must
not discriminate against any entity of a similar character based on the content of
its expression, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
48 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 804-05 (1985), a graduation ceremony is not a limited public forum. See
Daniel Parish, Comment, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CH. L.
REv. 253, 263-64, 277 (1994). See also Lundberg v. West Monara Community
Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 337 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Douglas Laycock, Equal Ac-
cess and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private
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In contrast, the court in Harris found that the ultimate school con-
trol over a graduation ceremony, including its financial backing and
presentation of diplomas to students who fulfilled all school require-
ments, made the event school-sponsored.143 The court rejected the
reasoning of Jones that the state's delegation of responsibility to the
students insulated the practice from constitutional scrutiny.144 The
court determined that students equally are obligated to attend and
participate in graduation prayers as in Lee, "either by bowing their
heads or 'maintain[ing] respectful silence.'"145 The court found that
Lee was controlling, and, accordingly, rejected the practice.1 4 6
When viewed in light of the Court's requirements of substantive
neutrality, the opinion in Harris is clearly consistent with the Court's
Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1986). A graduation features invited speakers
and a predetermined program based on the viewpoint and identity of the speaker.
See Parish, supra, at 283 ("where a forum is not 'robust' and tends to be used by
only one group" there is a perception of government support). Cf Wallace, supra
note 22, at 1261 n.373 ("The policy approved in Jones ... ensured that no minor-
ity views would be heard.").
143. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). The court
quoted Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992), stating, "At a high school
graduation, teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of control
over the precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the move-
ments, the dress, and the decorum of the students." Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No.
241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
144. The court stated:
[E]lected officials cannot absolve themselves of a constitutional duty by
delegating their responsibilities to a nongovernmental entity. Even pri-
vate citizens when acting with governmental authority must exercise
that authority constitutionally.... When the senior class is given ple-
nary power over a state-sponsored, state-controlled event such as a high
school graduation, it is just as constrained by the Constitution as the
state would be.
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447,455 (9th Cir. 1994). The court also
rejected the proposition that Mergens favors a finding of constitutionality, be-
cause Mergens involved the public forum doctrine under the Free Speech Clause.
Id. at 456-57. In contrast, the district did not open the graduation ceremony to
all speakers, but,
[olnly speakers chosen by the majority of the senior class are allowed.
The message of the speakers is also chosen by the majority . .. [and
hence] the relevant speakers are instructed to pray. No matter what
message a minority of students may wish to convey, the graduation fo-
rum is closed to them.
Id.
145. Id. at 457 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992)).
146. Like the court in Jones, the Ninth Circuit also applied the Lemon test. However,
in its Lemon analysis, the court again rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach in
Jones. The court found no secular purpose in an Invocation and Benediction be-
cause solemnization through prayer is by nature a religious act. Id. at 458 (quot-
ing Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38
(1985)). See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963). Because




Establishment Clause holdings.147 The schools fund and ultimately
control graduations, and their primary function is to publicly disburse
diplomas-school certificates paid for by the state and earned on the
basis of school performance.148 School sponsorship, as found by the
Court in Lee, is thus inherent in the nature of the ceremony. 149 Fur-
thermore, as Lee indicated, it is coercive to place an individual in a
situation where she must either participate in the prayer or publicly
identify herself as a dissenter.150 As in Engel, the student's formal
ability to abstain from the religious ritual does not mitigate the coer-
cive nature of the practice.
Because a graduation ceremony is a school-sponsored event, the
fundamental principles of school-oriented substantive neutrality ap-
ply.151 Recognizing that Lee precluded their selecting a graduation
prayer, the school districts in Jones and Harris delegated the state's
authority to students. The districts thus attempted to circumvent the
Constitution by transferring the decision-making authority to a pri-
vate body.152 Because the specific purpose of the schools' delegation
was, however, to allow for the students to make a religious decision,
Kiryas Joel indicates that this type of delegation is unconstitutional.
As the Court in Kiryas Joel stated, "IT]he difference lies in the distinc-
tion between a government's purposeful delegation on the basis of reli-
147. See Stone, supra note 56, at 845 (stating most student-sponsored prayers will be
unconstitutional). See also Paulsen, supra note 97, at 838 n.155; Millard, supra
note 15, at 774-775 (criticizing Jones).
148. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285,288 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mount
Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Cf Ro-
senberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2523 (1995)(must "take[ ] sufficient cognizance of the undisputed fact that no
public funds flow directly to [a religious group's] coffers").
149. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992)("At a high school graduation,
teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the pre-
cise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress,
and the decorum of the students."). See also Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch.
Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1981)(stating that the school maintains the
control over school ceremonies); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288
(E.D. Va. 1974)("A graduation ceremony for a public school class, held on public
school grounds, and administered by public school personnel, at which diplomas
are officially awarded by the administration, is a public school event.") Cf Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2523
(1995)(student publication is not state sponsored).
150. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992); Paulsen, supra note 97, at 847-
48. See also Jesse H. Choper, Religion in Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu-
tional Standard, 47 MN. L. REv. 329, 3443 (1963); Dent, supra note 49, at 715;
Stone, supra note 57, at 836; Wallace, supra note 22, at 1261 ("Rather than re-
ducing the effects of peer pressure, the school's policy actually sanctions it by
allowing a majority of students to use the machinery of the state to impose their
approved religious exercise on nonadherents.").
"151. See Dent, supra note 49, at 715.
152. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1973); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966);
Paulsen, supra note 97, at 838 n.155.
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gion and a delegation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals
whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic au-
thority."153 Based on this analysis, the statement in Jones that "a ma-
jority of students can do what the State acting on its own cannot do"
flatly contradicts the holdings in Larkin and Kiryas Joel.
Furthermore, under the rationales of Stone and Ball, the risk of
religiosity resulting from a delegation of the decision on graduation
prayer is unreasonably high. A specific student vote on prayer, held at
the behest of the school, constitutes an implicit school suggestion that
a graduation prayer would be appropriate (or at least would not be
inappropriate). 154 Although it is possible that the students would
vote against the prayer, 155 Ball indicates that the mere risk of subtle
religious influence, even in a predominately secular setting, is uncon-
stitutional.156 Stone similarly indicates that while it is possible the
suggestion for prayer will be inconsequential, if it "ha[s] any effect at
all," it will be to compel participation in prayer. 157
Finally, that the prayer was the result of a vote is constitutionally
insignificant. As the Court stated in Schempp, a majority cannot "use
the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."158 By mandating
that students hold an express vote on the inclusion of a graduation
prayer, and by then including the prayer in the subsequent school-
sponsored graduation, the state effectively allows a majority of stu-
dents to use its "machinery" to impose their beliefs.159
As a result, where the state purposely delegates its authority to
students to vote on graduation prayer, the entire scheme should be
found unconstitutional. By focusing on the technicalities of the school
district's practice, the court in Jones overlooked the fundamental
guidelines of substantive neutrality. By contrast, in Harris, the court
153. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2489
(1994).
154. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist.
No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 423 (E.D. Ark 1973); Laycock, Equal Access, supra note
28, at 8; Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated, supra note 51, at
1003.
155. For instance, the students may elect not to have prayer or other religious
worship.
156. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
157. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
158. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963). See also id. at 226 ("One's
right to ... freedom of worship... may not be submitted to vote". (quoting West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943))). But see Betsy Levin,
Essay, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and In-
dividual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L. J. 1647, 1662 (1986).-
159. See Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 340 (N.D.
Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531, 537
(S.D. Iowa 1985); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Va.
1974)(No vote of a majority of those participating can absolve conduct therein
which abridges constitutional rights."); Millard, supra note 15, at 774-75.
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accurately analyzed the plan as delegating to a majority of students
the decision to inject their religious beliefs into a school-sponsored,
mandatory event.
B. Facially Neutral Practices
Facially neutral practices that result in a student-sponsored grad-
uation prayer entail the second, more difficult analysis.160 Such situa-
tions can arise where the students administer the entire graduation
ceremony, select the speakers, or simply request a prayer without
state prompting. Because the state is not involved with the selection
of the religious message, the inclusion of the prayer is less attributa-
ble to a state choice than in Harris and Jones, where the state specifi-
cally asked students to vote on prayer.161 Additionally, the
procedures themselves, neutral in appearance, do not suggest religion
will be infused in a manner necessarily warranting constitutional re-
view. Unlike Ball, which evidenced at least minimal intermingling of
public schools and religion, these facially neutral procedures imply no
inherent entanglement with religion.
Before analyzing the constitutionality of these content-neutral pro-
cedures for selecting speakers, it must be noted that schools constitu-
tionally are permitted to require that graduation speeches be free
from religiosity or any other contentious subject matter.162 In Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier,163 a school deleted stories on di-
vorce and pregnancy from the school paper. The Court noted that a
school can prohibit students from expressing personal views on school
premises where it believes that such expression will "impinge upon
the rights of other students."' 6 4 In addition, the Court stated that the
First Amendment rights of students in school are not as broad as
those of adults in other settings, and "[t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropri-
160. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)(otherwise neutral proce-
dures can violate the Establishment Clause). See also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993)(facial neutrality
not determinative for Free Exercise Clause).
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 n.8 (1992)(Souter, J., concurring)("If
the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular
criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to
deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an endorse-
ment of religion to the State."). See also Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 28, at
9.
162. See Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1981)("no
meaningful distinction between school authorities actually organizing the reli-
gious activity and officials merely 'permitting' students to direct the exercises").
163. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).




ate properly rests with the school board."'165 In upholding the school's
censorship of the stories, the Court determined that a school's right to
suppress student expression at school-sponsored events was broader
than its right to restrict the content of non-intrusive expression that
generally occurs on school premises, because in the former situation,
the school effectively supplies a forum that would otherwise not exist
and is, therefore, constructively promoting the speech.166 The Court
continued, stating,
In addition, a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity
of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of
Santa Clause in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage
sexual activity in a high school setting. A school must also retain the author-
ity to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to
•.. associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of
political controversy.16 7
Therefore, where the school wishes to avoid controversial or divisive
topics, it can limit speech at school-sponsored events.168
Similarly, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,169 a school
disciplined a student for using indecent, but not obscene, language at
a school assembly. In upholding the punishment, the Court distin-
guished the case from the "passive expression of a political view-
point,"170 because the speech in Fraser "intrude[d]... on the rights of
other students."17 1 The Court specifically noted that while students
may express religious views, and views on other divisive subjects,
outside of schools, the sensibilities of students must be taken into ac-
count at school events.1 7 2 The Court quoted Justice Black's dissent in
Tinker, stating that the Constitution does not compel schools to "'sur-
render control of the American public school system to public school
students.' "17s
Thus, the school can control the "style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored events so long as their actions are reason-
ably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."174 The Court contin-
ually has recognized the "divisive" potential of religious worship
165. Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
166. Id. at 270-72.
167. Id. at 272.
168. See id. at 272-73 ("a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression").
169. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
170. Id. at 680.
171. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)).
172. Id. at 681.
173. Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 526 (1969)(Black, J., dissenting)). See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 870 (1982).
174. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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in schools, where sects compete for representation.175  Schools
can, therefore, surely suppress such a controversial topic at
graduations.176
That schools have the right to censor student speech at gradua-
tions fails to resolve whether schools are obliged constitutionally to
impose restraints that prohibit religiously oriented messages obtained
through procedures that are facially neutral. In contrast to the court's
analysis in Jones, the proper focus in such religion-neutral procedures
is not on the practices by which prayers arise, but on the fact that they
have arisen. The Court in Lee, by extending substantive neutrality to
graduation settings, recognized that a constitutional harm occurs
when a prayer is offered at a public school graduation. The Court
stated that "[t]he injury caused by the government's action.., is that
the State, in a school setting, in effect required participation in a reli-
gious exercise."17 7 As a result, the analysis should focus not on the
"means" for selecting prayer, but on the "ends"-the fact that a prayer
175. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-56 (1992); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). See also Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31, at
507-08 (regarding the divisiveness of religion).
176. See Guidry v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., Civ. Action No. 87-2122-LC (E.D. La.
Feb. 22, 1989), aff'd sub. nom. Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1990)(upholding school's right to forbid valedictorian, chosen on behalf of her
grade point average, from delivering religiously oriented graduation speech);
Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 338 (N.D.
Iowa 1989)(a school's banning of prayer is not based on content, but subject mat-
ter); Ingber, supra note 112, at 779 n.37. See also DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch.,
799 F. Supp. 744, 754 (E.D. Mich. 1992)(forbidding student from showing video-
tape of her singing proselytizing song during show and tell). But see Memoran-
dum Opinion and Standing Rule for Courtroom of William M. Acker, Jr., 1990
WL 126265 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 22, 1990)(forbidding use of the word"God" when court
session is opened but also criticizing Lee); Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 28,
at 13 (subject-matter ban is still a content-based restriction); Wallace, supra note
22, at 1199-1200 (secular discussions unintentionally disparaging religion are
antireligious). Whether the school can exclude religious messages from school-
sponsored events, while allowing all other forms of politically divisive speech, is a
question the Court resolved this term in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). The Court held that by allowing
certain types of expression, public schools are forbidden from individuating reli-
gion as a proscribed topic. However, Rosenberger concerns the use of student
funds for a religiously oriented college newspaper, and thus is similar to Mergens
because it involves no mandatory school events and there is no institutional
school pressure on students to engage in religious worship. Additionally, the
Court directed its opinion only with regard to "the University setting, where the
state acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is
at the center of our intellectual and philosphic tradition," a tradition not associ-
ated with high schools, where the students are less mature and less able to dis-
tinguish between school sponsorship and free speech. Id. at 2520. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Tanford v. Brand, 883 F. Supp. 1231,
1240-41 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
177. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
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occurs at graduation.178 As one court has noted, "[a] constitutional
violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary school graduation
setting, a prayer is offered, regardless of who makes the decision that
the prayer will be given."17 9
A state is normally not responsible for the action of private par-
ties,1SO and before requiring the state to protect individuals from
harms inflicted by third-parties, the injury must be fairly attributable
to the state.-8 1 Although a graduation prayer causes a constitutional
harm, private actors may inflict that injury.1 8 2
There are several exceptions to the rule that the state is exempt
from liability for failing to prevent privately inflicted harms, and these
exceptions necessitate state action to prevent graduation prayer.
Where the state delegates a function traditionally within the exclusive
prerogative of a state to a private citizen, the individual acts with the
authority of the state and is subject to the same constitutional limita-
tions as the state acting on its own.18 3 Even if the speakers are not
considered state actors, where the state restrains an individual's free-
dom so that the individual cannot protect herself, or otherwise makes
a person more vulnerable to danger,18 4 it incurs a duty to protect that
individual.185
A student-sponsored graduation prayer implicates both of these ex-
ceptions, and thus must be considered state action. As noted earlier,
when the state confers its authority to perform an otherwise exclusive
state function to a private actor, it also must subject the actor to the
same constitutional limitations that bind the state itself. For in-
178. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rlv. 875, 920-22 (1986)(government-spon-
sored religious ceremonies are inherently unconstitutional).
179. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Va. 1993).
See also Weinhaus, supra note 4, at 980 (stating the Court likely would find any
type of prayer at a mandatory public ceremony unconstitutional).
180. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
181. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839 (1982); Paulsen, supra note 97, at
847. This inquiry is necessary regardless of whether the analysis is conducted
under the Lemon test, which asks whether a government action has a primary
effect of advancing religion, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1972), the endorsement test, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-95 (1989), or the coercion analysis used by Justice Ken-
nedy in Lee.
182. See Paulsen, supra note 97, at 798.
183. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
184. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982)(involuntarily commit-
ted patients must be protected against themselves and others); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1976).
185. Additionally, where the state itself creates the danger of a harm by a private
actor, the state is under a duty to protect. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
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stance, in Griffin v. Maryland,186 the petitioners, who were African-
Americans, entered a racially exclusive amusement park. The pri-
vately owned and operated park employed a private security officer
whom the sheriff had deputized. When the security guard arrested
the petitioners for trespass, the Court found that the officer, vested
with state power, was a state actor. The Court stated, "If an individ-
ual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that au-
thority, his action is state action."187 Because the state itself could
not bar African-Americans from the amusement park, the Court found
the security guard's actions violated the Constitution.188
Similarly, schools traditionally have maintained the exclusive
right to select speakers and control the content of graduation ceremo-
nies and other school-sponsored events.' 8 9 Hence, by granting stu-
dents the authority to select graduation speakers, the state bestows
its official authority upon them.' 90 The students thus undertake a
traditionally exclusive public function in selecting graduation speak-
ers.191 Because they select the graduation speakers, their "action is
186. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
187. Id. at 135. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1965)("when private
individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or fanctions govern-
mental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and sub-
ject to its constitutional limitations").
188. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1964). See also Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953)(private action forbidden by Constitution); Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 323 (1941). Although the Court later indicated Griffin did not purport to
determine whether a police force is an otherwise exclusive state function, Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 n.14 (1978), Griffin nonetheless is germane
because of the delegation of an explicit state authority.
189. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 454 U.S. 260 (1988); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994); Gearon v.
Loudoun County Sch. Board, 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993); Lundberg v.
West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 337 (N.D. Iowa 1989);
Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809,813-15 (Cal. 1991); Eugene C.
Bjorklun, The Rites of Spring: Prayers at High School Graduation, 61 ED. L. REP.
1, 1 (1990). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354 n.9
(1974)(discussing the pervasive government control over schools).
190. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). The state also
enforces the decisions of the students by sponsoring a graduation ceremony with
student-selected speakers, thus creating a joint participation between the stu-
dents and the school. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978);
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir.
1989).
191. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97,
99 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 323 (1941).
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state action,"'192 and they are bound by those constitutional bounda-
ries that confine the state.193 Following Lee, the precepts of substan-
tive neutrality clearly indicate that a school's selection of a speaker to
deliver a graduation prayer contravenes the Establishment Clause.' 9 4
Students vested with that state authority face the same restriction.
Griffin and Lee, therefore, combine to prohibit students from using
delegated state authority to include religious-based messages at grad-
uation ceremonies. Although generally a public entity is not subject to
vicarious liability for the constitutional violations of individuals acting
pursuant to state authority,195 where the school delegates to students
unfettered decisionmaking authority regarding the speakers and
ideas to be included in a graduation ceremony, the school is itself lia-
ble for any resulting constitutional violations.' 9 6
192. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964)("If an individual is possessed of
state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state ac-
tion."). See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)(delegation of state authority);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)("Misuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law.").
193. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,299 (1966); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130,
135 (1964).
194. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
195. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992); St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986);
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
196. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84, 484 n.12 (1986). See also
Steven S. Cushman, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: Toward a New Definition
of Municipal Policymaker, 34 B.C. L. REv. 693, 713-18 (1993)(discussing munici-
pal liability as a result of delegations of authority). Where the school itself re-
tains the ultimate authority to control the messages included in the graduation
ceremony, the failure to review the speakers chosen by the students also renders
the school liable. See Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1325 (7th Cir. 1993); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 794 (11th Cir. 1989);
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924
(1990); Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1403 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 906 (1989); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386 (4th Cir. 1987); Parker v.
Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1989); Cushman, supra, at 713-18. See
also Hammond v. Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 1988)(concerning munici-
pal liability based on a policy-maker's ratification). Similarly, if the school exer-
cises some discretion over the speakers, the failure to impose restrictions and
guidelines on the students in selecting graduation messages can render the
school liable. See Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1326 (7th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Chicago, 787 F.2d 200,204 (7th Cir. 1986)("in
situations that call for procedures, rules or regulations, the failure to make policy
itself may be actionable"); Fiacco v. Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 329 (2d Cir. 1986);
Avery v. Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981). See also Guidry v. Colcasieu
Parish Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 87-2122-LC (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 1989), aff'd sub nom.
Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990)(upholding school's right of for-
bidding valedictorian from delivering religious graduation speech); Lundberg v.
West Momona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 338 (1989)(restricting
student presentation of religious messages in class).
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Alternatively, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services,197 the Court noted that a state's duty to protect an
individual from private injuries can arise where the state has exer-
cised physical control over the individual. Although previously the
Court has only recognized this duty in circumstances involving invol-
untary physical confinement,198 mandatory school events are con-
structively similar restraints of freedom.199 The Court in Lee found
attendance at a graduation was de facto mandatory because a student
"is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real
sense of the term 'voluntary,'- 2 00 and thus "the State has in every
practical sense compelled attendance.201 Because students at gradu-
ation ceremonies are "captives" during a state-sponsored event, their
freedom is temporarily restrained in a manner equivalent to state con-
finement.202 A student who is not "free" to skip the ceremony is,
therefore, under state control.
For this reason, the "captive audience" analysis regarding state re-
strictions on free speech is particularly apt. An individual who "can-
197. 489 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1989).
198. See Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)(suspects in
police custody); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982)(involuntarily
committed patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)(prisoners).
199. See Susanna M. Kim, Comment, Section 1983 Liability in the Public Schools After
DeShaney: The "Special Relationship" Between School and Student, 41 UCLA L.
Rlv. 1101, 1130 (1994). Although the few courts to address the question have
concluded that schools do not have a "special relationship" with students that
creates a duty to protect students from private torts, these cases have not consid-
ered whether such a duty is owed at compulsory school events, such as within the
classroom during instruction. See, e.g., Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538 (11th Cir.
1994)(student killed in car accident after summer session); Dorothy J. v. Little
Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993)(student attacked by other student);
Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992)(student death in cloakroom
adjacent to classroom), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1266 (1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992)(en banc)(student mo-
lested by other student), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); J.O. v. Alton Com-
munity Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990)(student molested by
teacher). However, in Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836, 842-43
(10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 638 (1941), the court assessed liability
against the school for a student injury arising from an explosion that occurred
during a labaratory experiment, a school-sponsored activity. Similarly, in the
classroom, a failure to adequately supervise frequently gives rise to state liability
for reasonably forseeable private torts. See Donald H. Henderson, Negligent Lia-
bility Suits Emanating from the Failure to Provide Adequate Supervision: A Crit-
ical Issue for Teachers and School Boards, 16 J. L. & EDuc. 435 (1987). See also
James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges'Increasing Exposure to Liability:
The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J. L. & EDuc. 453 (1987)(discussing the liability of
universities for student harms).
200. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
201. Id. at 2661.




not avoid the objectionable speech" is a captive, "figuratively ...
trapped [and]... left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted
speech."203 At a graduation ceremony, "children have no choice but to
sit through [any prayers].... If they don't like what they see or hear,
they are most assuredly not free to get up and leave."204 Additionally,
at this obligatory public event, students not only are unable to avoid
harmful messages promulgated by speakers,205 but, according to Lee,
are coerced into participating in any religious worship.20 6 Students at
graduation ceremonies therefore are "captives" unable to protect
themselves from potential harms.20 7
Thus, "[a] symbolic washing of hands.., by state officials cannot
purge them of their responsibility."208 Merely enacting facially neu-
203. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
204. See Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1993);
Paulsen, supra note 97, at 828. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971)(unwilling viewers can avert their eyes).
205. See Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir.
1993)("We do not expect young children to put cotton in their ears and scrunch up
their eyes to avoid overtly religious messages."). See also Paulsen, supra note 97,
at 842 (indicating the difficulty in avoiding the messages). But see John H. Gar-
vey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 761, 768 (1993)(hearing a prayer
is not coercive or a demand to participate).
206. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). Paulsen points out that the coer-
cion identified in Lee is not "private," as the government places individuals in a
situation wherein they must either participate in the prayer or publicly identify
as dissenters. Paulsen, supra note 97, at 847-48. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). If the sole source of pressure were private, the case
would be difficult to distinguish from Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990).
207. Furthermore, the state itself creates the danger of constitutional injury. Gradua-
tion ceremonies are compulsory, school-sponsored events at which students are
unable to avoid religious messages. By lending the machinery of the state to a
majority of students to broadcast any message suiting their whim, without re-
striction, the state effectively allows a majority of students to inflict constitu-
tional harms on unwilling listeners. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2469, 2659
(1992)(a constitutional injury occurs where the state required participation in a
religious exercise); Wallace, supra note 22, at 1261. As noted by the Court in
Lemon, "The [risk] inheres in the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
617 (1971). See also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 387 (1985)(discussing the
risk of indoctrination); Henderson, supra note 199, at 446 ("school personnel are
expected to be able to recognize that the danger inherent in some activities or
events is too risky for pupils to assume"). By holding a school-sponsored event at
which attendance is compulsory, and giving students free reign to broadcast their
messages of religiosity, the state constructively creates the risk of harm to the
dissenter. Additionally, where facially neutral procedures exist, and the school
fails to warn students of religiosity, a dissident student's lack of awareness of a
forthcoming prayer enhances her vulnerability; whereas a student with fore-
knowledge that a graduation ceremony will contain religiosity can, at least, skip
the ceremony (an option the Court in Lee deemed a Hobson's choice). See Berger
v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1170 (7th Cir. 1993)(a student
without foreknowledge can take no preparatory actions).
208. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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tral procedures to choose graduation speakers cannot satisfy the
state's duty to guarantee substantive neutrality, as the constitutional
harm that occurs with a graduation prayer is attributable to the
state.209 That conclusion finds support in the Court's sentiment in
Schempp that the guarantee of substantive neutrality means the
State cannot permit a majority to "use the machinery of the state to
practice its beliefs"210 and is consonant with the principle that the
religious dissenter should not be forced to endure the "embarrassment
. . . isolation and affront" that religiosity in the public schools
produces.211
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Lee found graduation to be one of life's most meaning-
ful events.2 12 To maintain the strict neutrality demanded by the Es-
tablishment Clause, school districts must not only uphold Jefferson's
"wall" but respect Daniel Weisman's dissidence. To include prayer in
such a meaningful ceremony risks alienating a religious dissenter for
the sake of redundancy-to "solemnize" an already profound occa-
sion.213 As noted by Kenneth Karst,
When government displays the symbols of the dominant religion-as when
government displays the symbols of white supremacy-the pain is not distrib-
uted evenly. In the zero-sum game of status dominance, it is only the losers
in the politics of religious division who suffer the pain of status
subordination.2 14
Student-proposed prayer resulting from a majoritarian scheme en-
hances this subordination by apprising the non-adherent that her reli-
gious views are insignificant. She must accept not only her minority
status, but that her peers ignore her objection. If a purpose of educa-
tion is to "inculcate fundamental values,"215 and if "tolerance of diver-
gent.., religious views" is such a value,216 then the school should
follow its own lesson and, as the court in Harris declares, "respect the
constitutional rights of others."217
209. See Kathleen M Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv.
195, 207 (1992)("Banish public sponsorship of religious symbols from the public
square.").
210. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
211. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
212. Id. at 2659.
213. See Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31, at 508.
214. Karst, Politics of Religion, supra note 31, at 511. See also Wallace, supra note 22,
at 1202 ("It is indeed ironic that some who protest the loudest the removal of a
nativity scene from city hall never display such scenes on their own front
lawns.").
215. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
216. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
217. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 459 (1994).
1995]
